The text
3.1.0 In the following chapters I present a close reading of the actual text of the third and fourth paragraphs of Frege's 'Der Gedanke'. Toward this end I begin by quoting the text of both paragraphs in full and making the immanent argumentative structure of the text explicit. I have structured the text into sub-paragraphs (i) -(x) and added headings as well as insertions. [(i)] Grammatically, the word 'true' appears as an adjective. Hence, the desire arises [(α) Initial question:] to delimit more closely the region within which truth could be predicated, the region in which the question 'Is it true?' could be in principle applicable. We find truth predicated of pictures, ideas, sentences, and thoughts. It is striking that visible and audible things occur here along with things which cannot be perceived with the senses. This suggests that alterations in sense have taken place.
The truth of pictures and ideas (I-truth) as correspondence.
[(ii)] Indeed they have! For is a picture, as a mere visible and tangible thing, really true? And a stone, a leaf is not true?
[(iii)] Obviously, we would not call a picture true unless there were an intention involved. A picture is meant to represent something.
Neither is an idea called true in itself, but only with respect to an intention that it should correspond to something.
[(β) Assumption:] It might be supposed from this that truth consists in a correspondence of a picture to what it depicts.
The first objection: scientific truth is absolute.
[(iv)] Now a correspondence is a relation. But this goes against the use of the word 'true', which is not a relation word, does not contain any indication of anything else to which something is to correspond. If I do not know that a picture is meant to represent Cologne Cathedral then I do not know what to compare the picture with in order to decide on its truth.
The second objection: scientific truth is perfect (it does not admit of gradations).
[(v)] A correspondence, moreover, can only be perfect if the corresponding things coincide and so just are not different things. It is supposed to be possible to test the genuineness of a banknote by comparing it stereoscopically with a genuine one. But it would be ridiculous to try to compare a gold piece stereoscopically with a twenty-mark note. It would only be possible to compare an idea with a thing if the thing were an idea too. And then, if the first [idea] corresponds perfectly with the second [idea], they coincide. But this is not at all what people intend when they define truth as the correspondence of an idea with something real. For in this case it is essential precisely that the real thing be distinct from the idea. But then there can be no perfect correspondence, no perfect truth. So nothing at all would be true; for what is only half true is untrue. Truth does not admit of more or less.
The third objection: scientific truth is independent.
[(vi)] Or does it? Could we not maintain that there is truth when there is correspondence in a certain respect? But which respect? And what would we then have to do so as to decide whether something were true? We should have to inquire whether it were true that, for example, an idea and something real correspond in the specified respect. And with that we should be confronted again by a question of the same kind, and the game could start all over.
